The Stance of the Revolutionary Forces on the Question of the Army
By Yasir Arman
October 8, 2024
The Islamists’ Current Target Bank:
Controlling the Army with a Racist Agenda
The Stance of the Revolutionary Forces on the Question of the Army
By Yasir Arman
October 8, 2024
1. The Current Debate on the Army:
The current debates on the army these days are as tricky as a rooster trying to sleep
on a rope. The public anger toward the army didn’t arise from thin air; it is a result of
the army leadership’s stance on the December Revolution, the coup, and the
ongoing war. However, a reasoned discussion about the armed forces is necessary.
The military is an institution of the state, while the Islamists are a political movement.
The army is broader than the Islamic Movement, thus the errors of its leadership and
the crimes committed in its name should not deter us from distinguishing between
the Islamists and the army. It is essential to untangle the theoretical, intellectual, and
political confusion regarding the army and avoid falling into the mutual deception
between the army’s leadership and that of the Islamic Movement, whose alliance is a
marriage of convenience that has an expiration date.
2. The SPLM’s Experience and the Stance on the Army:
In 1988, I joined the SPLM’s media team in Addis Ababa. The SPLA radio played a
crucial role in delivering its political message. At the time several things bothered
me, with the most significant being the viewing of the Sudan armed forces as a
monolithic “enemy army” and the failure to acknowledge SPLM casualties as
martyrs. My leftist analytical background, which I still use, led me to a different
understanding of the military. I decided to engage in a direct dialogue with Dr. John
Garang about the class and social structure of the Sudan army and the different
political influences within it, as well as the need to recognize the fallen SPLM heroes
as martyrs, publicly given their full recognition. When I raised these issues with Dr.
Garang during a Sunday meeting at his home in Addis, we had an in-depth
discussion that lasted several hours. Politics with Dr. Garang was always like a
fast-paced game of ping-pong, full of great insights. Dr. Garang being a thinker, an
intellectual, a former army officer, and a left-leaning academic, had a profound
understanding of the state’s superstructure and its social systems.
We concluded that the military is a complex entity with intricate class and social
dimensions. There is a distinction between the interests of senior, junior and
non-commissioned officers, and soldiers. The army is influenced by the social and
political conflicts around it and is not an isolated island. We agreed that this reality
should be reflected in our political rhetoric and SPLM media strategy, avoiding
considering the army as a monolithic bloc. Dr. Garang continued to provide me with
information via phone and the SPLA’s signal unit, especially after I became the
SPLM’s official spokesperson for 15 years. We often intercepted and analyzed
military signals. Among our media engagements with Sudan’s Armed Forces was the
famous “Waat Debate” on SPLA Radio in 1990 with a force that was heading to Bor,
led by the late Brigadier General Abdel Aziz al-Nur, a nationalist who later joined the
opposition against the Islamist regime.
Today we must prevent the Islamists from driving the army in a racist and ethnic
direction—this is a key objective of theirs. If unchecked, it will lead to the collapse of
the army, further fragmentation of Sudan, and an increase in violence and crimes.
These days, the National Congress Party’s Islamists are particularly targeting
Darfur—its human resources and ethnic tensions—aiming to turn it into a hotbed of
ethnic conflict, much like their previous tactics in South Sudan. At this stage, they
have mobilized top leaders like Ahmed Abbas in Sennar, Ibrahim Mahmoud in Port
Sudan, along with their old guards, such as Karti and Ali Osman. They are sniffing
the winds of power, not the winds of heaven, with their wide presence from Sudan to
Turkey that is full of internal contradictions.
3. A War Without a Center:
The current war is distinct because its leadership is not centered in Khartoum, the
historical seat of power. Unlike the previous wars in the rural areas of Sudan, this
war began by displacing millions, killing many, seizing their properties, and disrupting
institutions in the heart of power. However, the absence of the center doesn’t mean
the absence of its mentality.
4. The Army’s Roots and its Role in Power:
The origin of Sudan’s Armed Forces dates back to the 1898 invasion by the British,
making it one of the oldest and most complex institutions. Its complexity deepened
with the Islamists’ takeover of its leadership in their 1989 coup. The army predates
the 1956 state, which despite its many flaws, is preferable to the 1989 regime and
the current quasi-state born out of the April 15 war.
The Islamists regime continuously integrated the army’s top leadership into the ruling
political and economic elite, linking their interests to the regime. However, viewing
the army as a monolithic bloc under Islamist control is incorrect. Over three decades,
the Islamists have fragmented the army through purges, dismissals, and executions.
Still, they never fully trusted it, hence creating militias and parallel armies to guard
against coups and their inability to wage wars in rural areas against Sudanese
nationalities with legitimate demands.
The anger towards the army’s leadership is justified and understandable. But this
frustration should not cloud our vision or analysis. The army was used by the
Islamists as a tool to crush the December Revolution. Without the army, the Islamists
are too weak to suppress the revolution. They seek to control the armed forces, even
though today’s military is not what it once was. Their only hope for returning to power
lies in riding on the back of the army, despite the contradictions within their marriage
of convenience.
We should not be deceived by the Islamists’ propaganda portraying the army as the
military wing of the Islamic Movement. While they love to exploit the army, they also
fear it. This is evidenced by their social media attacks on the army’s leadership
whenever it distances itself from their schemes. The issue of the army is far from
settled and we need a sharp analysis to expose the Islamists’ deceptions. A
balanced discourse on the army is crucial, even as its leadership repeatedly aligns
itself with the Islamists in their attempts to crush the December Revolution.
5. The Power Struggle – Sudan Army (SAF) vs. Rapid Support Forces (RSF):
The best option for the alliance between the army and the Islamists is to weaken and
trim the wings of the RSF, making it a junior partner. The refusal to negotiate,
including the Geneva platform, stems from the RSF being more powerful than a
junior partner should be. Both the army and the Islamists—two separate entities, not
one—are working towards a military campaign that will reduce the RSF to a minor
partner within an authoritarian regime hostile to the December Revolution. The
relationship between the army and the Islamists is fraught with contradictions and
ambitions, heightened by the war and the state’s weakness. Yet, both sides realize
the necessity of their alliance, for political and military reasons.
We, the democratic forces and the December Revolution’s supporters must keep a
cool head and think rationally about the army issue. We must reaffirm our stance on
building a single professional army that reflects Sudan’s diversity and the completion
of the revolution’s tasks as prerequisites for sustainable solutions. We must avoid
extremist positions on the army or falling into the trap of the Islamists, who are intent
on destroying the revolution through ethnic and racial incitements, as well as through
violence and the manipulation of religion. Additionally, we should also analyze the
contradictions among the Islamic movement, while welcoming the Islamists who are
taking a stance against the war.
6. Rebuilding the Army in the Aftermath of the Revolution:
The December Revolution did not leave the army untouched. It had an impact within
its ranks. The army is not an isolated island from the revolutionary climate. Despite
the leadership’s flaws and the deep-rooted issues of the state, the army remains an
institution that must be rebuilt as part of a state-building project. Our country needs a
single unified army, and we must end the Islamists’ state capture and hijacking of
institutions, particularly the military.
The December Revolution started the process of freeing the army. However, its
biggest mistake was taking a defensive approach after the sit-in was dispersed,
rather than an offensive one, to dismantle the Islamists’ state capture. Their
continuous sabotage, including their influence inside and outside the army, remains
a major challenge.
Even in the midst of this war, we must analyze the army’s composition and
acknowledge its importance as an institution that can be rebuilt; we should not throw
out the baby with the bathwater. The Islamists’ war must be exposed relentlessly,
while maintaining a balanced discourse on the army. Not everyone who supports the
army is against the December Revolution. Ordinary people associate the army with
the survival of the state and the need to end the war. This requires a calm, deep
discussion with our people, without accusations of treason, and we must learn from
the experiences of Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq, without falling into the Islamists’
trap.
Victory to the masses.
Victory to the Decemberists.
The revolution will outlast the war.