The biggest danger to Sudan!


By Elbarag Elnazir, Press Secretary of the former prime minister of Sudan, Abdallh Hamdok.

This article aims to alert everyone to the danger looming over the country of Sudan and the region due to the current war. Although this war can end at any moment under the weight of international pressure more than internal pressure, the factors of its continuation are increasing with the expansion of its area day after another, and its circumstances are tempting. With the entry of other players, their interests intersect at one time and coincide at other times.

And the expression of the land of Sudan and not the state of Sudan puts the geographical location and open borders of seven countries without any natural barriers that limit movement and response to control, at the heart of the debate about the current war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces of a militia nature, and the possible changes in their nature and the expected outcomes in the event persistence for a long time. This expression can also raise attention to the overlap between the population groups on the border between Sudan and these seven countries, which carries with it all the economic, cultural, and political characteristics, including the interests, customs, traditions, natures, and norms prevailing among these societies.

Internally, it is possible to identify categories that are considered a heterogeneous dominance, which confirms the state of fragmentation within Sudanese societies that have reached its extent, and these categories could be divided into:

1- A supporter of the war, biased towards one party against the other, due to direct interests with this or that party.

2- Rejecting both sides and rejecting war, even if behind this refusal a foreseeable and expected political interest.

3- Or rejecting war as it is and for humanitarian reasons, abstract personal fears, or genuine national compassion,

4- Whoever stands in the category of neutrality, given that what is happening is a senseless war, and it is useless to call for its cessation or its continuation.

5- Or those who stand on the fence waiting for one party to win over the other in order to announce their support for it, and this constitutes represents sturdily a small opportunistic group par.

6- Or a group stands on the fence indifferently and in complete reluctance reaches the stage of conviction that there is no point in entering into this conflict, and letting what happens happen even if the state collapses.

Thus, the internal forces, according to this fragmentation, cannot positively influence the current conflict unless they stand unified with clear and specific goals behind single forces which appear at the end of this article.

But externally, many countries, especially in the neighbour countries and the region, stand on their combs, terrified of the outcome of this war and its repercussions and its impact on their internal conditions, as many other countries of the world, especially countries closely related to the countries of the region and Africa and those with common interests with them, are watching what is happening in the country of Sudan and awakening in Every day, and their leaders put in hands, calculators, papers and documents, and updated information, and some of these countries have their finger on the trigger!

After the occurrence of this war, it seemed clear that the internal situation in the country of Sudan had reached its extent of fragmentation, between the civil/civil forces, and the civil/military forces. Military/military fragmentation, especially with the presence of nine armed factions distributed in various Sudanese territories, in addition to the army and rapid support forces. However, the worst danger of this fragmentation is the emergence of other groups that are more trained, have the highest capabilities in waging disputes and are greater in strength and organization when the conflicting forces collapse, or retreat and weaken their capabilities, especially military capabilities, and here I mean the extremist religious forces and groups.

Despite the writer’s assessment that these extremist forces and groups, especially ISIS, cannot be part of any plan for an alliance with the Armed Forces or the Rapid Support Forces under their current leadership, especially with the large and organized opposition to this group and similar groups from a large number of countries in the world, with great presence of the countries with weight. Political, economic, and military capabilities, with which the leadership of the Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces Command are keen to maintain a degree of friendship with them for many reasons. However, it is worth considering that the extremist forces and groups do not wait for allies such as the army or the Rapid Support Forces to find a foothold in the land of Sudan, which has become open to them. It is weak on the security, political and economic levels, as it has apparently hidden alliances, and allies with capabilities, presence, and spread, but the status of these allies, their legal obligations, and their security status, do not allow them to interfere in Sudanese affairs in a blatant way, and therefore they ally themselves with such extremist groups and give them a helping hand. And help to achieve common interests in sharing abundant resources such as gold and uranium, and to gain positions on the ground to access those resources, and to find markets for weapons, drugs, and other products, and take advantage of the state of chaos to confront or defeat other enemies that they cannot face openly.


Islamic movement and leaders of the armed forces

The military was keen to appear as protectors of the state, its security, democracy, and change, as well as defending civil rule and revolution, from the emergence of the first military council (April 2019), until the outbreak of the April 15, 2023 war, among them as allies representing the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, describing the leaders of the first to the second as rebels. stigmatizing the second to the leaders of the first as coup plotters; However, the new factor that emerged after the outbreak of the war is that RSF is trying to place the leaders of the armed forces in the category of defenders of Islamist interests as if RSF has allied with them over the past four years and fought with them in crimes, conspiracies, coups, and intrigues without verifying their position on this change! Was Rapid Support Forces so naive to believe and deal with the leaders of the armed forces as merely patriotic revolutionary officers and not party-affiliated?! And was the leadership of the armed forces so smart that it concealed its alliance with the Islamists throughout this period and showed its friendliness and agreement with the Rapid Support Forces, while they were implicit and identified with another, more reliable alliance?!

It may seem to many that the leadership of the Sudanese army is close to Islamists, especially during the current war in Sudan, but if we look closely, we find that the opposite has happened since the collapse of the Bashir regime in its first phase under the weight of the valiant popular revolution, and this is what has been happening until today. The Islamists and their leaders knew a long time ago, that is, during their first fall in the valiant sit-in in front of the Army General Command Square in 2019, that there is no way to bring them to power again except through the same military forces that contributed to their removal, including the Rapid Support Forces. The Islamists who were overthrown by the revolution after April 2019, tried to approach the military council, in many forms and means and on different occasions, starting with an attempt to participate with members of their own in the first military council, followed by an attempt to enter the palace gates through civil leaders and local administrators and entities, and then they added that, with a flirtatious speech, which differentiates that authority and distinguishes between civilians and the military as if they are not partners. This is despite the fact that the military confirmed that they gave them their full back by signing the constitutional document in August 2019, and by signing a new agreement again after the coup against the transitional authority on October 25, 2021, with the resigned Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok. In November 2021, it did not last long due to the military’s abandonment of its obligations in it and the civil forces’ distancing from it out of fear of the street or hoping for new participation, and then the signing of the two sides of the current war, months before its outbreak, on a new framework agreement in December 2022.

Thus, it does not seem that the military swallowed the bait of the Islamists. On the contrary, they tried every time to make this unsolidified situation a beginning only to seize and grab the fallen opportunities from the mistakes of civilians as opposed to those who assumed the power, and from the mistakes of the fallen loyalists to the National Congress Party with their various banners, and these attempts continued. Many and various tricks, in order to inherit the rule from the Islamists instead of a civil democratic transition leading to elections, and then completely monopolize it after that towards an authoritarian state that hides its ugliness with false civil representation behind slogans of protecting the state, which can be renewed later and every time with sham elections that bring them from New as it happened and still happening in the region. The military leaders of the army and the Rapid Support Forces were not satisfied with Islamists only, but also used non-Islamic groups, part of the civil and armed groups that signed the Juba peace agreement with the transitional government (October 2020), civil, regional, religious and capital groups, and even used the contradictions within The forces of the revolution themselves in order to achieve their complete monopoly on governance, and it goes without saying that the entry of part of the Islamists and forces that were participating in the Al-Bashir regime until its fall, within the recent framework agreement appears as one of the clear evidence of this approach taken by the military to seize opportunities.

However, most of the parties that the military leaders did not clearly approach are the extremist Islamic groups, and I do not attribute this to fear from neighbour countries or afar, but one of the basic assumptions on which this article is based is that the military leaders did not approach such groups except within a limited basis. And within the limits of the presence of these groups within the large alliances in which these groups do not appear except through individuals known for their political and intellectual fluctuations more than their sectarian hardness. I attribute it to the realization of the military leaders on both sides (the Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces) that their end will be at the hands of this type of group if they try to blatantly ally with it. Thus, these groups are the only ones on which both sides can wage war relentlessly and without tactical stances, but rather according to a well-defined strategy and vice versa, and the sure reason is their knowledge that these groups are eviler than Thamud and Ad societies,[1] not because they possess the intensity of fighting and might, but because Sudan In its previous and current situation, it represents an ideal environment for the spread of their discourse, the extension of their control, and their attraction even to the fighting soldiers on both sides, with the ability of these groups to mobilize groups from other regions, near and far, which will destroy the dream of control and victory for the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces, dispersed or as a group, according to their perceptions and the perceptions of their supporters that prevail now. Rather, the dream of returning to Sudan may be blown up on the fourteenth of April itself, that is, a day before the war, and this is a situation that may prevail for a very long period if there is no urgent settlement of the conflict now taking place, and according to a binding agreement and reliable guarantees that remove the armed forces and Rapid Support Forces from power, and according to which Urgent application of military and security reform within the army that includes disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration(DDR) of all armed groups to reach one army with high professionalism and its basic doctrine is to protect the state.

Islamists and extremist groups

The reality is that the Islamic movement, despite the rapprochement and coordination that occurred earlier in the nineties of the last century with extremist groups and their icons and the countries that sponsor them, and despite what began to emerge again in the form of alliances under different names, such as the Broad National Movement, the Sudan Call group, and other names, they do not coincide fully with these extremist groups in Sudan, whose ideas belong to or are similar to extremist groups in the region and ISIS in particular; The concerned extremist groups view the Islamic movement itself and other Islamic groups that are more or less extremist and moderate, such as the Salafist groups, the Ansar al-Sunnah group with its branches, the Muslim Brotherhood, the sheikhs of the Sufi orders, and others, as the first enemy of their project, which tends to get rid of them from the start, but ISIS prefer temporary alliance with these groups, and with the same tactics adopted by the Islamic movement with the leadership of the army, as mentioned above, in order to defeat the Sudanese revolution scheme, which was built entirely in contradiction to the religious scheme of the state in all its forms, as the slogans of the revolution were modern and scientific (freedom, peace, and justice), which match the term(SMART), specific, measurable, realistic and time-bound. And since the youth, who led the revolution, know very well that the difference between these groups is a difference of amount, not a difference of kind, and since they all end up with tyranny that departs from the meanings of democracy that the youth seek; Democracy that is based on collective leadership rather than the individual rule, and the grassroots structure that seeks to expand local popular participation instead of the rule of elites, whether elites are rightists, leftists, liberals, centrists, or hereditary, and the national vision in benefiting from resources in development instead of begging outside and waiting for aid with The commoditisation of the country’s capabilities, which is a scheme that even the civilian forces that represented the revolution did not succeed in realizing, according to the vision that these youth wanted!

DAMS… State organization in Egypt and Sudan

In the land of Sudan, the issue of the spread of terrorism and extremist groups is almost absent from the political and security agenda and only appears within the framework of security cooperation defined by a political interest or because of conditions set by other countries, which did not happen during the transitional government or in light of the current war, but rather it happened on a larger scale. Years earlier. This is despite the recurring incidents in Khartoum and the city of Wad Medani since the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the current century, through the killing of American diplomat John Granville in Khartoum in 2008,[2] and the news about Sudanese educational institutions that spawned mobilized, and sent convoys of male and female students to join these groups in other countries, and not content with the confrontations with terrorist cells in September and October of the year 2021, which are the incidents that lasted for nearly a week, and despite that, the popular media confronted them with a lot of scepticism, perhaps due to the repeated attempts to deceive and falsify the facts that were associated with the biography of the military in general, and during the past four years in particular, and on many occasions, the most important of which was the dispersal of the sit-in near General Command in Khartoum (June 2019). Perhaps the peaceful collective mind in Sudan also contributed to this, especially in periods of relative stability, rejecting the existence of such groups or being terrified of their spread and the spread of their harm, as witnessed, known, and tested in countries near and far.

According to a report by Anadolu Agency about these groups (there is no real monitoring of their presence or areas of their spread, and how they are formed, but some interested people divide them according to their areas of presence, which often appear to exist in conjunction with a violent incident, such as the «Kombo Ten Group» and the «Salama Cell». «, and others

And «Kombo Ashra» is an area near the city of Madani in central Sudan, in which clashes took place at the end of 1993 between a takfiri group and the police, which led to the killing of more than 17 of the group).[3]

News websites (October 4, 2021) indicated that Sudanese intelligence reported the killing of 4 terrorists and the arrest of 2 terrorists at a location in the Jabra area (south Khartoum), and the arrest of 2 others at a second location in the same area, and “the terrorist group fired heavy bullets at the Sudanese forces, killing an officer.” Sudanese and wounding 3 others. And a statement was issued on September 28 by the Sudanese General Intelligence, in which it announced (within the context of the efforts made by the General Intelligence Service towards securing and stabilizing the country and in full coordination with the security services to combat and fight extremist terrorist activities and based on the availability of information about a cell affiliated with the terrorist Daesh). Carrying out a security operation to arrest this group in the neighbourhoods of Jabra, Blocks 18 and 14, and Al-Azhari, Block 14. The statement added that the operation resulted in the arrest of 11 foreign terrorists of different nationalities. The statement also said (the General Intelligence Service counted five martyrs, including two officers and three non-commissioned officers, and one officer was wounded, and then the group of four foreign terrorists escaped)![4] No one knows yet where this group fled to, and with whom they are cooperating in order to hide from view and with the inability of the General Intelligence Service to reach them!

The Sudanese remember how (Muhammad Ali al-Jazouli) appeared, whom the Rapid Support Forces recently published a video recording of, in which he indicated that he had been «belonging to ISIS since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi» and added, «until now»![5] However, Al-Jazouli appeared in many recordings during the revolution, through which he clarified his clear tendencies toward extremist groups. Before the revolution, he did not hesitate to announce his pro-ISIS position through newspapers, forums, and platforms, as the Islamic Ingaz regime turned its back on him whenever it wanted, turned into ignorance at the time that suits its policies, and throws him in prisons and detention centres several times, and allows him to appear on local TVs more than it does with ministers and governors.

It appears to many that the Rapid Support Forces recorded this confession by al-Jazouli, whose content, however consistent with his ideas and scheme, lacks the most basic foundations of justice and rights, as it detracts from the legality of recording and broadcasting it. This type of action, in addition to indicating a kind of direct revenge against him for his repeated criticisms of the Rapid Support Forces and its leadership, especially during the past year, is the most obvious attempt – that is, the Rapid Support Forces – to prove that the leadership of the armed forces obeys the orders of the Islamists and belongs to them and «Kizan», which a term referring to the Islamic movement and its various branches in Sudan. The RSF also wants, in addition to emphasizing the sympathy of the army leaders for the moderate and extremist Islamic forces and their coordination with them, to send a clear message in this form and content not only to the interior, and not in order to confirm the defence of the Sudanese revolution – and the restoration of democracy as they say – which succeeded in overthrowing one of the longest and worst Dictatorships in Africa led by the Sudanese Islamic movement, but rather the farthest and most priority goal is to confirm the remoteness of RSF from these groups and even to take the appearance of consolidating the counter side with them! We do not make harsh accusations if we say that this technique is completely taken from the techniques of the Al-Bashir regime in dealing with national security issues from the point of view of direct and momentary interest, not strategic dealings!

Not far from all of this is the emergence of flags and the conduct of a demonstration under the banners of groups closer to extremism at the end of October of the year 2022, and under the hearing and sight of the military authority, headed by the leaders of the Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces together.

Military, dream of power, and harmful pragmatism

I will present here a number of evidence in order to confirm that the leadership of the armed forces themselves and throughout their history in power understand this complexity, between their dream of monopolizing power, and their confrontation and fight against multiple forces that dispute this power. It is worth mentioning that could include extremist religious groups, of which a group like ISIS is considered the most dangerous.

The first of these pieces of evidence is historical, which is that any alliance or rapprochement occurred between the civil political forces and the armed forces, no matter how different the first was in its ideologies or intellectual doctrines, or the way it allowed them to reach power, whether it was through elections or through a popular revolution, and no matter how much they felt empowered by controlling the armed forces. It ends up with the gallows, the jails, or at the very least the expulsion from power. On the other hand, there is a complete monopoly of power by the armed forces, with fluctuations in alliance and hostility with these civilians of all kinds. This happened from Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud (1900-1983), who seized power by handing over and took over in November of 1958, from Prime Minister Abdullah Bey Khalil (1892-1970), and it happened from Al-Numairi (1930-2009) who turned against power with the support of forces from The left in May 1969, as happened from Al-Bashir (1944-) after masterminding the entire coup by the Islamic Front in June 1989, and recently occurred between the forces of freedom and change and Lieutenant General Al-Burhan (1960-) after the first leadership of the revolution in December 2018 through peaceful demonstrations and processions until Al-Bashir was uprooted in April of the year 2019, and then completely seized by Al-Burhan in October of the year 2021, and this will happen later with whoever and under many pretexts if the ball returns in the same way and without learning from the lessons!

The second evidence is that throughout the periods of military rule in Sudan, the military leadership did not remain on an intellectual or ideological doctrine or a specific political direction. Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud was the first initiator, as he said in his first statement (November 1958), which he did not begin with the Basmala, but began by saying: People, I greet you today with the best greetings. And he added after the greeting, saying: All of you know and fully recognize what the country has reached in terms of badness, chaos, and instability for the individual and the groups. And he concluded his statement after an extensive tour of the wording and meaning to show the badness of the political parties and forces and their attempts to monopolize power, with a number of decisions dissolving the parties and stopping the newspapers and preventing gatherings and demonstrations![6] It is known that Abboud’s regime began where the last democratic government ended before his coup, as a man concerned about the country’s state, security and stability, but he ended with a dictator who was overthrown by the force of the popular revolution in October 1964, not only that, but he ended as an accused of involvement in crimes that were not mentioned much in the sources that spoke about this period, but those sources focused on other issues residing in the centrality of the Gordonian elite thought,[7] more than issues of a human rights and humanitarian nature for the peoples of Sudan with its borders known at that time, especially in the north and south parties, in addition to the displacement of the people of Wadi Halfa and the flooding of the monuments of Nuba (1963), Dr. Mawut Acheicque Guarak indicated in his book (Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan) that the regime of Ibrahim Abboud was involved during his rule in killing thousands of citizens of southern Sudan, so that “ prior to departure from power, Abboud murdered more people than any president in the history of Sudan except  Al-Bashir![8]

Many sources indicate that Abboud deliberately pursued a new policy in his foreign relations after seizing power, as he recognized the People’s Republic of China and maintained his relations with the United States of America at the same time and in a strange paradox, and despite that, he ended up with the project of forced Islamization of southern Sudan and the attempt to Arabize it, which is the approach In which the Ingaz regime followed it in a worse way and on other places other than southern Sudan, and he also signed the Nile River Water Sharing Agreement (1959), the effects of which the Sudanese state is still suffering to this day. In addition to that he presented the worst experience in protecting national capabilities by flooding Wadi Halfa And the displacement of its people for nothing, and his reign was the starting point for the national governments’ pursuit of politicians and their suppression, and the beginning of an approach that was repeated later by all military governments in despising partisan forces, and contempt democracy claiming that it leads to chaos, and he was also the first national ruler who disrupted the democratic constitution and dissolved the democratic parliament and enacted the suspension of newspapers And prevent gatherings and demonstrations!

Egypt is the sister of my country or the sister of the army?!

And here is this news as another confirmation of what we are aiming for Al-Youm Al-Sabea newspaper, dated May 8, 2022, said that President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi received a phone call from Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sudanese Transitional Sovereignty Council, who expressed to the President his sincere condolences for the martyrs of the terrorist operation that took place in west Sinai, and wishes for a speedy recovery for the injured, stressing Sudan’s solidarity and support for Egypt in efforts to combat terrorism.[9]

In addition to that news, it is worth saying that many observers and those interested believe that the current Egyptian regime – the Egyptian regimes are the closest in the world to the Sudanese Armed Forces throughout history – is ignorant of the nature of the alliance that connects the military leaderships with the Islamic movement or ignores it during the current conflict in Sudan, this with everyone aware of the extent of hostility between the current Egyptian regime and the Islamists. The obvious fact is that the Egyptian state has had links with the Sudanese army since its founding, i.e., with a date prior to the emergence of modern Islamic currents and even before the rise of the star of the founder of The Muslim Brotherhood Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), and thus the Egyptian state has stronger ties with the army than such temporary alliances. The first signs of this clearly appeared in Sudan at the end of the seventies of the last century, and what clearly emerged in the late days of Nimeiri, who ruled for sixteen volatile years between different forces that started from the far left and ended with a short alliance with the Islamists within a few months before the people overthrew him through a popular revolution in April 1985.

The Egyptian regimes know very well that the military leaders in Sudan sanctify power and deceive to cling to it, and in order to seek to monopolize it, they ally themselves with any party, Islamists, liberals, or leftists, and they use all of these and those as needed and according to circumstance and context.

In order to protect their interests, Egyptian regimes work to keep up with the military leaders and get close to them, and even absorb their ambitions even by supporting them in the repeated coups against the democratic civil regimes in Sudan, and in this course, they reproduce generations after generations, so that their links with the military forces in Sudan will not be severed, because they consider Sudan a strategic depth historically, a back garden full of treasures, including vast fertile lands, and because the mentality that controls power in Egypt, regardless of who receives it and in different eras, believes that Sudan represents a private property of the Egyptian entity and a natural extension of Egypt in every challenge that the Egyptian state faces, if this challenge internally or regionally, and a resource and economic challenge or a security and political challenge. That is why the Egyptian state considers the army, which possesses arms and represents the apparatus of state violence, to be the true guarantor of the continuity of the interests of the Egyptian state, and therefore it will spare no effort in embracing the army, even if it embraces the snake.

The above-mentioned clearly shows the current Egyptian regime’s knowledge of who its allies are in Sudan, and that it will not be an ally except for the military which sits on the seat of power and helps it in that, but it seems that the current war is on its way to confuse the Egyptian state’s accounts, as this war for the first time threatens the cohesion of the Sudanese armed forces It puts forward potential alternatives that may not be of the same degree of rapprochement with the Egyptian state and may be a real threat not only to Sudan and Egypt but even to the region and the world as a whole.

Egypt is the ideal gateway for ISIS

At the end of 2014, according to many press websites, the Beit al-Maqdis group organized an armed military parade in the Sheikh Zuweid area in Sinai, with more than ten four-wheel drive vehicles, and they were raising black flags and wearing black clothes, and chanting slogans in support of the Islamic State and its emir, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. They distributed flyers to the people, and since that date, terrorist attacks, bombings, and sniping of Egyptian soldiers have been repeated in Sinai, the city of Arish, Qalyubia, and other regions, including the Egyptian capital, Cairo, until these attacks and incidents over the past nine years reached nearly a hundred attacks and accidents, and most of them were adopted by The Islamic State organization under the name of the State Organization, Sinai Province. The attacks also included hostage-taking and the killing of civilians, and many incidents were recorded in video clips published by the organization to confirm its responsibility and presence.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi asked, “In a televised speech on the occasion of the celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, Al-Sisi said today, “I oblige Lieutenant General Mohamed Farid Hegazy (chief of army staff) within 3 months to restore security and stability in Sinai…you and the civilian police… And all brute force is used… all brute force.”[10] Of course, Al-Burhan repeated the meanings of this phrase with a change of some words during his appearance among his soldiers on May 30, 2023, where he said, “The armed forces are waging this battle on behalf of their people, and they have not yet used their full lethal force, but it will be forced to do so if the enemy does not obey or respond to the voice of reason!»[11]

   ISIS is at the centre of global attention

The International Coalition against ISIS was formed in September 2014, according to the coalition website,[12] and today it includes 86 members of partners, including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Chad, the European Union, Britain, Turkey, and other entities and countries. During the coalition meeting that took place in Rome two years ago (June 2021), US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken warned that the organization poses a growing threat to regions outside the Middle East, including Afghanistan, Yemen, North Sinai, Egypt, and regions in West Africa. Another meeting took place in Belgium in December 2021 during which US Special Envoy John Godfrey noted the Coalition’s focus on preventing an ISIS resurgence in Iraq and Syria and expressed continued support for building on Coalition efforts against growing ISIS threats elsewhere, with a focus on affiliate groups to ISIS in sub-Saharan Africa and Afghanistan. According to news websites, Italian Deputy Political Director Luca Franchetti Pardo and Special Envoy Godfrey announced the establishment of the Alliance’s Africa Focus Group, with Morocco and Niger joining the United States and Italy as co-chairs of the group. John Godfrey is the current ambassador of the United States to Sudan (since August 2022), which indicates that the United States’ preoccupation with the matter in Africa and Sudan, in particular, is not new, but rather renewed, and constitutes a major goal in which it will not obtain significant successes in light of the outbreak and expansion of the war in Sudan. On the contrary, these developments may pose specific challenges to the coalition in general, Africa in particular, and Sudan in very particular.

Blinken indicated during the opening of the ministerial conference on combating ISIS, which kicked off Thursday, June 8, 2023, according to Sky News Arabia, that «the deterioration of security and humanitarian conditions and the absence of economic opportunities are the fuel that ISIS relies on to spread and recruit fighters.» In the same context, Asharq Al-Awsat published Blinken’s statements, in which he said, «Blinken highlighted that the situation is getting worse according to what he described it, in the African Sahel region, with “the increase in terrorist attacks by ISIS, and Africa recording half of the victims of terrorist attacks in the last period.”[13]


DAMS again!

DAMS is an acronym invented by the writer, to refer to the Islamic State in Egypt and Sudan, and it is a plagiarist from the origin of the term (ISIS), which refers to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham. What the writer means here is that all the indications, according to the above narration, say:

1- The armed forces or the Rapid Support Forces have no interest in creating an environment conducive to the intentional expansion and control of a new ISIS in Sudan (i.e. DAMS), coming from neighbouring countries, including Egypt, Libya, Somalia, West, and Central Africa, and in cooperation with its cells already in Sudan, so that the spread of this Extremist groups in the current scene in Sudan will not only mean the total destruction of the Sudanese state and the transition from the category of war that could end with negotiations to the category of comprehensive chaos that is difficult to control, but it will certainly mean the lack of opportunities for the two forces to exist, let alone continue in power.

2- The military support of the regional and international forces for either party against the other in the current war in Sudan, assuming that this party will win, is a kind of dream that will not be realized in the presence of lurking and semi-dormant forces, but they are the most prepared and able to fully control in the event of chaos.

3- Talking about any blatant international intervention in light of the current conditions will not be in the interest of the Sudanese state, because it will enhance the chances of extremist groups entering the arena in the name of patriotism, anti-occupation, and resistance to Western invasion, or under claims of protecting identity and culture. Any intervention of this kind will be prolonging the crisis and be increasing the cost, which will eventually be paid for by the Sudanese people and the Sudanese state, if any.

4- The complex structure of the Sudanese state and the diversity and disparity of the population groups and their geographical distribution in Sudan in terms of economic capabilities, resources, cultures, customs, and traditions, do not appear in such circumstances as a preferential advantage among the other countries and peoples of the world. The factors of its disintegration are greater than the factors of its integration, which will be an opportunity for the expansion of extremist groups.


I conclude from this article that the only forces benefiting from the conflict currently taking place in Sudan are the extremist groups. Neither the armed forces with all their spectrums have the ability to maintain balance in the Sudanese state, nor the political forces on the right, left, or centre have the weight with which they can maintain the balance of power. The civil forces cannot mobilize a popular front behind its civil projects, as these forces are facing internal historical, organizational, substantial, intellectual, and political problems and challenges that have existed since before the war.  However, modern forces that were formed in the midst of the revolution (Resistance committees),[14] are more appropriate to assume the leadership, given the availability of some factors:

1- Its unity behind the slogans that it produced and exerted a lot for, which are represented in freedom, peace, and justice.

2- Creating and electing leaders from within that carry their characteristics, believe in their scheme, and have remarkable experience over the past years, so that it is difficult to break them or disrupt them in the face of any temptations, and reflect their independent voice that is resistant to all attempts to domesticate them for the benefit of any other scheme, and lead this new leadership in cooperation with Sudanese experts from various disciplines. A serious political process that includes laying the foundations and mechanisms based on transparency, integrity, and credibility after its contribution to stopping the war, and to drafting an interim constitution, and through this process, a government of independent competencies is formed for a transitional period with specific tasks and term and works with it to establish free elections that lead to good governance.

3- Its distance from polarization in all its forms, and the meaning here is not only polarization from political parties and forces. This is an experience that the political forces themselves must realize that they were of little benefit. Rather, what is meant is polarization based on religious, regional, provincial, or tribal bases. This type of Polarization divides and does not unite, just as it will cause the Resistance Committees to lose their flavour because they are a shining example of the meanings of national unity, unity of purpose and destiny, and unity for the sake of the democratic civil scheme and against the tyrannical enemy or the tribal one, rather it will become stronger the more fragility the resistance committees become, and the farther they move away from their scheme and dream of building a comprehensive, democratic and inclusive civil state for all of Sudan; A state of equitable distribution of power and revolution, a state of comprehensive justice, and a state of sustainable peace based on balanced development and fair management of resources among all Sudanese.

4- Serious support from the internal, regional, and international political forces for these groups to assume their responsibilities in facing the challenges of the survival of the Sudanese state and in fulfilling the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to them; Support that is not bounded by limits and is not bound by conditions, and is not expected of an alliance, recruitment, or bargaining over direct immediate interests, and support devoid of diseases of espionage and benefit in one direction and free from the whims of political forces internally and other countries externally, aiming to design a loyal authority through which it can control through unilateral projects within a situation of a very fragile and weak country at the present time, such as Sudan.

[1] Thamud and Ad are two ancient Arab groups who were tormented because of their disbelief in the messengers according to the Holy Qur’an

[2] (AFP) – Sep 21, 2008, Sudanese admit US diplomat murder in video confession


[4] The page of the Sudanese General Intelligence Service – the media site, September 28, 2021

[5] Rapid Support Forces Face book page May 23, 2023

[6] Lieutenant General Abboud’s statement on November 17, 1958

[7] A term referring to the elites that ruled Sudan and monopolized power and wealth for decades since Sudan’s independence in 1956 %D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8 %A9

[8] M. Guarak: Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan: An African Renaissance, Author house 2011



[10] November 2017




[14] Large groups of Sudanese youth are decentralized in a large number of Sudanese regions and cities. They were formed over the years and led protests peacefully against the Al-Bashir regime. They organized effectively during the Sudanese revolution (2018-2019), and these groups still have the greatest influence.