S I T U A T I O N U P D A T E May 2023 – A Pause Not a Peace: Conflict in Jonglei and the GPAA


Following a combined Dinka–Nuer attack on

Murle in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area
(GPAA) in December 2022–January 2023, youth
forces have returned home, and the onset of
the rainy season will prevent another major
mobilization in the coming months.
Small-scale Murle attacks on Dinka and Nuer
communities continue. Retribution for such raids
was a major motivating factor in the mobilizations
of November–December 2022. Raiding also
remains a central means of resource acquisition
in the state.
A variety of government-led and international
NGO interventions have failed to address the root
causes of conflict in Jonglei, including protracted
economic and humanitarian crises.
Administrations in both Bor and Pibor lack the
means and will to resolve the crisis. Denay
Chagor, the outgoing governor of Jonglei, had
political capital in Juba but not among his home
constituents, the Lou Nuer. His time as governor
was characterized by administrative struggles
and corruption scandals. On 8 May 2023, his
removal was announced by South Sudanese
President Salva Kiir. Lokali Amae Bullen, the chief
administrator of the GPAA, is a weak figure who
lacks the capacity to control Murle youth forces.
In January 2023, a US-sanctioned company paid
for the release of at least 60 Murle abductees
held by Lou Nuer youth in Pibor. Revenue from
the return of abductees was used to purchase
materiel from soldiers in the South Sudan
People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF). The government
purchased the freedom of further abductees in
Ayod county, Jonglei, in April 2023, with material
assistance from international NGOs.
Humanitarian convoys are being repeatedly
attacked, with over 100 metric tons of supplies
looted from January to March 2023. These attacks
compound the dire humanitarian situation in
Jonglei and the GPAA.

A Pause Not a Peace: Conflict in Jonglei and the GPAA2Small A r m s Survey SITUATION UPDATE
Mobilization for a large-scale assault on the
GPAA began in Nuer and Dinka areas of Jonglei in
November 2022, against a backdrop of intermittent
Murle raids, which resulted in abductions of women
and children and stolen cattle. Lou Nuer White Army
leaders and spiritual authorities declared a need to
stop such raids and seek retribution.1
Both the national and the state governments
repeatedly appealed to the Lou Nuer not to mobilize,
but without success. The failure to prevent the
mobilization represents a broader crisis of political
legitimacy. In Akobo, government salaries go unpaid
and the Lou Nuer have seen no peace dividends
since the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on
the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of
South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in 2018, which brought to
an end five years of brutal government assaults on
Lou Nuer civilians (Craze, 2020). In May 2023, Lou
Nuer youth detained two Jonglei state ministers in
Gadiang and held them hostage, while demanding
the payment of salary arrears. The Lou Nuer consider
the state government in Bor to be illegitimate and
think that the outgoing governor of Jonglei, Chagor,
was an appointee from Juba without local support.2
In this context, the White Army has emerged as the
actor with political legitimacy for the Lou Nuer, with
little reason to be beholden to Bor or Juba. A similar
situation applies to Dinka and Murle armed youth.
In December, Dinka youth mobilized in Duk county
and joined forces with Nuer White Army fighters,
principally from Akobo, Nyirol, and Uror. The raiders
initially targeted Gumuruk and Lekuangole. A
combined force attacked Gumuruk on 24 December,
defeating the Murle and razing the town. This force
continued into the GPAA, penetrating as far as
Lotilla and Verthert, 9 km from Pibor town. A second
wave of fighters, largely mobilized from Akobo East,
attacked Lekuangole on 26 December.
1 The White Army are young Nuer men, customarily organized as cattleguards and mobilized for communitarian struggles. See Young (2007).
2 See Small Arms Survey (2020) and Craze and Markó (2022).
3 Telephone interviews with Jonglei state government officials; UNMISS officials; international humanitarians; and Bor Dinka and Lou Nuer informants, January–May 2023.
4 Telephone interviews with Lou Nuer informants and UN officials, January 2023.
5 Telephone interviews with Lou Nuer and Bor Dinka present in Bor town during the sales, January–April 2023.
Tens of thousands of fighters participated in the
attacks, which led to over a hundred casualties,
the displacement of thousands of people to
Pibor town, the destruction of health facilities,
the razing of civilian property, and the theft of an
estimated 30,000 head of livestock.3 This assault
occurred despite continuing Murle raids, which
took advantage of the movement of much of the
Dinka and Nuer male population into the GPAA.
In December 2022 alone, seven Murle raids into
Uror county resulted in the deaths of 20 and the
abduction of 37 Lou Nuer civilians, as well as the
seizure of several thousand head of cattle.4
Following the raid on Gumuruk, some 5,000 Lou
Nuer went to Anyidi and Mareng Junction in Bor
South. Raided cattle were sold for cash and traded
directly for materiel with soldiers from SSPDF
Divisions 8.5 While the rhetoric in Juba is that
civilians must be disarmed, selling ammunition and
weapons to youth fighters in Jonglei has become a
necessary means of survival for intermittently paid
The commodification of
The raid into the GPAA was characterized by
significantly more abductions—which form part of
Lou Nuer attacks on the Murle—than usual. This
caused disquiet in Juba, especially as many of
those abducted women and children were from
the home village of David Yau Yau, the former
chief administrator of the GPAA and an ally of Kiir’s
regime. The government took the decision to buy the
liberty of the abductees.
The government used Benjamin Bol Mel’s ARC
Resources company to carry out the transactions.

A Pause Not a Peace: Conflict in Jonglei and the GPAA3Small A r m s Survey SITUATION UPDATE
Bol Mel is a close associate of Kiir, and his
companies—many of which, like him, are under
US sanctions—are involved in the economic
reproduction of the regime (The Sentry, 2021).
Appointed a senior presidential advisor in December
2022, and then deputy secretary general of the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s (SPLM)
National Liberation Council in March 2023, Kiir is
thought to be grooming Bol Mel to be his successor,
according to rumours in the capital.
In January, Bol Mel purchased the freedom of
61 abductees, for SSP 400,000 each (roughly
USD 500).6 The abductees then flew to Pibor
on a chartered flight. Officially, the Jonglei
state government has denied these purchases.
Government and Lou Nuer White Army sources have
confirmed, however, that they occurred.7 Some of
the revenue was used to purchase further materiel
from SSPDF Division 8 soldiers.8
The purchases have been widely criticized due
to the risk of creating a market for abductions,
with revenue generated being used to perpetuate
a cycle of violence, raids, and abductions. Lou
Nuer communities are now requesting financial
compensation for the return of abductees.
Abductions have long been a part of conflict in
Jonglei and reflect a pastoral political economy
in which control of people is more important
than possession of land. Customarily, abductees
are absorbed into new families, whether Nuer,
Dinka, or Murle; however, if abductees are merely
commodities, and not potential future family
members, their status changes. The year 2023
has already seen an intensification in the sexual
violence meted out to abductees, highlighting the
potential dangers posed by the creation of a new
market in human beings. On 20 April, the Upper Nile
state government, with the material assistance of at
6 Telephone interviews with Lou Nuer White Army members, UN officials, international humanitarians, and Bor Dinka traders, January–May 2023.
7 Telephone interviews with politicians in Jonglei and White Army members, January–April 2023.
8 Telephone interviews with Bor Dinka and Lou Nuer informants, January–April 2023.
9 Telephone interviews with informants in Upper Nile and Jonglei, April 2023.
10 Division 8 is weak in part because many of the battle-hardened soldiers in Eagle Battalion—which formerly comprised Yau Yau’s Cobra Faction—were withdrawn to Juba at
the request of GPAA commissioners, who wished to weaken Yau Yau’s forces.
least one international NGO, purchased the release
of 41 Shilluk abductees from the Gawaar Nuer
prophet, Tut Makuach, who was in Ayod County,
Jonglei, indicating that such a market has already
been created.9
Security and legitimacy in
the absence of the state
The purchase of abductees only becomes
conceivable in a situation where the state is weak.
Juridical accountability for Lou Nuer raiders is
impossible because the government lacks the
military capacity to intervene, and so raiders on all
sides operate with impunity.
During the assault on Gumuruk in December 2022,
the SSPDF withdrew, rather than defending the
area against the White Army.10 Underpaid and
outmanned, the SSPDF is no match for armed
youth. As a result, youth forces have emerged as
the politically legitimate force in Jonglei. A February
2023 PAX Human Security Survey of the Dinka areas
of the state, which should be those most favourably
inclined towards the government, is striking (PAX,
2022). Over 60 per cent of the population thought
that the most likely cause of conflict in the next
year was poor national governance, while 80 per
cent said that their community relies on local armed
youth for security; only 19 per cent responded that
they rely on the police, compared to 62 per cent in
2016 (p. 1).
While the SSPDF stationed in Jonglei is too weak
to militarily intervene, the army has shown that,
nationally, it is capable of decisively entering the
field of battle; in Upper Nile in December 2022,
Mi-24 attack helicopters decimated the Nuer White
Army outside of Kodok (Small Arms Survey, 2023).

A Pause Not a Peace: Conflict in Jonglei and the GPAA4Small A r m s Survey SITUATION UPDATE
The SSPDF did not intervene in Jonglei because of
political, rather than military, weakness.
Kiir’s regime is supported by a fractious coalition.
While important Murle commanders and politicians
have backed Kiir’s elite coterie of Bahr el Ghazal
Dinka, to intervene on the side of the GPAA would
risk further alienating the Dinka of Jonglei, who
retain key positions in government and the SSPDF.
Such an intervention would also risk antagonizing
the Lou Nuer—just as Kiir is attempting to lure them
away from Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation
Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO), which is seen as
weak and merely a vehicle for Machar’s personal
In this context, it is more politically expedient for
the government to do nothing to address conflict in
Jonglei. Government inaction is the cost of keeping
Kiir’s coalition together.
The political state of Jonglei
The reign of Chagor, Jonglei’s governor, was
characterized by feuds and corruption scandals.
For instance, in 2021, Governor Chagor dismissed
the minister of agriculture, John Chol, after
Chol accused Chagor of diverting state funds to
his personal account. On 3 January 2023, Kiir
unilaterally dismissed the SPLA-IO speaker of
the Jonglei parliament, Amer Ateny Alier—in an
abrogation of the terms of the R-ARCSS—after Alier
criticized Chagor for the non-payment of salaries to
government workers. Humiliatingly for Chagor, Kiir
reinstated the speaker on 5 April 2023 as part of his
negotiations with Machar following the unilateral
sacking of Angelina Teny, the SPLA-IO minister of
defence and Machar’s wife, in a further violation of
the terms of the peace agreement.
Chagor’s appointments did not win him popular
support. Samuel Ateny Pech, appointed by Chagor
as city mayor, is a relative of Kiir’s bellicose
minister of information, Michael Makuei Lueth. As
mayor, Pech took land from women’s groups and
politicians, and sold it to investors from Juba—
forcibly evicting women’s groups from UNDP-built
sites guaranteed by Kuol Manyang Juuk, a Bor
Dinka SPLM stalwart. The mayor was denounced
by a Jonglei state minister, Isaac Mamer, who was
consequently sacked by the state’s deputy governor,
Jacob Akech Deng, on 23 March 2023. Protests
against the mayor in Bor eventually forced Chagor
to countermand the deputy governor’s order only
five days later, sacking the mayor and reappointing
Mamer. On 6 April, however, the tables turned
again when Kiir unilaterally appointed Pech as the
commissioner for Bor South, leading to protests
against Kiir and the state government and dissent
within the Bor Dinka political elite. Gabriel Jok Riak,
the former SSPDF chief of staff, is firmly opposed to
Pech’s appointment.
During Chagor’s reign, Deng, the deputy governor,
effectively ran the state. His alliance with Makuei
and the dismal performance of the state government
have contributed to his growing unpopularity,
however, and many figures within his own Twic
Dinka community are manoeuvring to replace him.
At the beginning of April, Bor was also struck by
demonstrations by civil servants protesting against
unpaid salaries dating back to October 2021—the
latest of many such protests. Only in Bor are such
demonstrations even conceivable; elsewhere in the
state, the government is almost entirely absent.
In May 2023, the clock finally ran out on Chagor
and Deng’s reign. Kiir negotiated with Gabriel
Changson Chang, the minister of higher education,
who is part of the same coalition as Chagor—the
South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA). Chang
agreed to a swap, with the SPLM receiving the
governorship of Jonglei, and SSOA being given
the deputy governorship of the state, along with a
national ministerial and a special envoy position.
For Chang, this was a chance to marginalize Chagor
within SSOA, while Kiir hopes to appoint a governor
who can bring a modicum of order to Jonglei. Denay,
denied his gubernatorial post, will likely be placated
with a special envoy position, while the rumours
in Bor are that the governorship must go to a Lou
Nuer, continuing an unspoken agreement about the
ethnic division of administration positions in Jonglei.
Riek Gai Kok, the veteran Lou Nuer politician, and
former minister of health, is thought to be the likely
gubernatorial candidate. Kok, however, played a
leading role in the government’s brutal offensives
against the Lou Nuer counties of Jonglei during

A Pause Not a Peace: Conflict in Jonglei and the GPAA5Small A r m s Survey SITUATION UPDATE
the civil war, and has little chance of gaining real
legitimacy among the White Army leadership. Given
the strong structural reasons for Jonglei’s conflicts,
whoever becomes governor is unlikely to be able to
instil order in the state.
Humanitarian delivery and
Conflict in Jonglei and the GPAA in December
2022–January 2023 has aggravated an already dire
humanitarian situation. The most recent Integrated
Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) for South
Sudan, published in November 2022, claimed
that Jonglei and the GPAA would be in IPC Phase 3
(crisis) or IPC Phase 4 (emergency) from December
2022 to March 2023, with certain areas facing IPC
Phase 5 (catastrophe) in both Jonglei (Akobo and
Fangak) and the GPAA (Pibor county) (IPC, 2022).
The situation is likely to get worse during the lean
season of April–July 2023, as household food stocks
diminish. The conflict has restricted movement and
caused displacement and losses of livestock.
In this context, humanitarian assistance has become
both invaluable to Jonglei’s communities and a
valuable prize to be contested. Since February
2023, humanitarian convoys in the state have been
repeatedly attacked, with 120 metric tons of food aid
taken in three exemplary incidents (though around
30 metric tons were recovered by the government).11
The road from Bor—the World Food Programme’s
(WFP) main distribution hub—to Pibor had been
largely closed since January 2022 by Bor armed
youth, following an attack on Bor South by Murle
raiders.12 After it reopened in January 2023,
humanitarian convoys were repeatedly looted in the
area around Anyidi. According to figures close to the
11 Telephone interviews with international NGO and UN staff, January–May 2023.
12 The road was reopened for a brief period in May 2022, before being shut down once again by Dinka youth from Anyidi and Baidit.
13 Telephone interviews with Jonglei politicians, April–May 2023.
14 While Bor South county was projected to be in IPC Phase 3, budget cuts have necessitated that WFP prioritize areas facing IPC Phases 4 and 5.
15 The convoy was composed of 9 WFP-contracted commercial vehicles, 9 Logistics Cluster-contracted commercial vehicles, 5 WFP fleet trucks, and 6 UN vehicles with
approximately 50–60 soldiers.
Jonglei state administration, the level of organization
involved in these attacks is such that it is highly
likely that members of the army and the government
are involved.13
The objective of these lootings is to attack Pibor
from a distance by denying food aid to the GPAA,
where the humanitarian situation is even worse
than in Jonglei. These attacks also express the
resentment of Anyidi’s Dinka population. WFP cut
food distribution in Bor South because of more
pressing needs elsewhere in the country and the
organization’s budget shortfall.14 This argument
does not convince the youth of Bor South, however,
who watch trucks full of food leave Bor, intended
for their rivals in Akobo and Pibor. In a zero-sum
struggle between populations, neutrality is not
possible, and even humanitarian assistance takes
a political position. In this context, the Bor Dinka
have little incentive to allow food assistance to be
delivered to the Murle.
On 27 April 2023, another humanitarian convoy was
attacked en route to Pibor at Anyidi. Two ‘bodas’
(motorbikes) drove up to the middle of the convoy
of 29 vehicles and forced two trucks off the road
at gunpoint. 15 While UNMISS vehicles were behind
the commandeered vehicles, they did not intervene
in the hijacking. After the event, UNMISS rapidly
deployed a Quick Response Force, and SSPDF and
South Sudan National Police Service forces also
arrived at the scene. The two hijacked trucks were
subsequently found, but UNMISS failed to recover
the food from these vehicles. Despite UNMISS force
protection for humanitarian convoys, attacks persist.
Without sufficient food pre-positioned in Pibor, there
is a high risk of hunger-related deaths during the
rainy season. Attacks on convoys, however, prevent
such pre-positioning.

A Pause Not a Peace: Conflict in Jonglei and the GPAA6Small A r m s Survey SITUATION UPDATE
Humanitarian convoys are also attacked around
Gadiang, Uror county. These attacks often target
vehicles returning after distributing food aid and
focus not on looting, but on rendering the road
insecure. Small Murle raiding groups that continue
to attack Lou Nuer civilians in Uror and Nyirol
counties may be responsible for carrying out these
operations, although this has been denied by
sources close to the GPAA administration.16 The
other possibility is that these attacks are carried
out by SSPDF soldiers, in what is effectively a
mafia protection racket, designed to force WFP
into accepting and paying for a military armed
escort, thus ensuring that someone—finally—pays
the army’s wages. The SSPDF and the Jonglei
state government have repeatedly attempted to
pressure humanitarian organizations into accepting
government escorts.
Peace prospects
The raid into the GPAA in December 2022 was
not considered a success, as it did not produce
sufficient material benefits for the Lou Nuer. While
this led to criticism of the White Army leadership,
continued Murle raiding, including in Nyirol county
on 12 April, has caused disquiet. Persistent Murle
attacks are likely to lead to growing demands for
a retributory strike on the GPAA, given that such
small-scale raids are unlikely to cease. Murle age-
sets are both geographically located—such that
groups in Pibor town have little influence over those
in Lekuangole—and increasingly broken down into
further subsections. Each of these subsections has
autonomy over their decisions, making it difficult
for the Murle as a whole to reach agreements about
The Pieri peace agreement was signed in March
2021, with the aim of resolving conflict between
the Lou Nuer, Bor Dinka, and Murle. Since then,
however, no community in Jonglei or the GPAA has
seen a substantive improvement in their material
circumstances. Violence remains the central means
of securing both economic value (via raiding for
16 Telephone interviews with Murle politicians, April 2023.
cattle, looting humanitarian supplies, and taking
abductees) and social capital (due to successful
participation in raids). Without profound political-
economic transformation in the state, raiding will
remain a primary means of improving male socio-
economic standing.
The Pieri process failed to stop Murle raids into
Lou Nuer and Dinka territory. White Army members
frequently cited these raids as the key reason for
the mobilization in November–December 2022.
Perversely, then, the attack on the GPAA, rhetorically
at least, had one of the same objectives as the Pieri
process, and differed only in its means.
Since the assault on the GPAA in December 2022–
January 2023, a number of rival peace processes
have been launched, none of which are likely to be
effective. The Jonglei state government was largely
hostile to the Pieri process because it included the
Lou Nuer spiritual leader Dak Kueth and White Army
leaders who have political legitimacy, and as such,
undermine the posturing of the state governor. A Lou
Nuer peace conference under Chagor’s direction,
held from 2 to 4 March in Juba and facilitated by
the UNMISS, included almost none of the major Lou
Nuer figures with local support, and served only
as an empty rhetorical exercise to give Chagor the
appearance of popular support.
UNMISS also plans to facilitate a Murle dialogue,
which is likely to face significant challenges. The
chief administrator of the GPAA is a weak figure
and does not command the same respect as his
predecessors. A meeting between the Dinka groups
of Jonglei is unlikely, as a split emerged in November
2022 between the Bor Dinka and the Dinka of Twic
East and Duk counties, who have long chafed under
Bor’s dominance.
The problem with UNMISS’ efforts is that they tend
to prop up government figures who have neither
popular legitimacy nor the capacity to influence
events on the ground. In order to break the cycle of
violence in Jonglei and the GPAA, engaging with the
actual actors responsible for raids is paramount.

A Pause Not a Peace: Conflict in Jonglei and the GPAA7Small A r m s Survey SITUATION UPDATE
More recent outreach efforts by the mission have, to
its credit, attempted to engage with these figures.
Implications for the
international community
On 15 March 2023, the UN Security Council
extended the UNMISS mandate until March
2024, and included bold new language giving the
mission the right to ‘use all necessary means to
ensure effective, timely, and dynamic protection
of civilians under threat of physical violence
through a comprehensive and integrated approach,
irrespective of the source or location of such
violence’ (UNSC, 2023, art. 3).
It is uncertain whether UNMISS can deliver on
such a mandate. During the assault on the GPAA in
December 2022–January 2023, the mission did not
intervene to stop any of the attacks on civilians that
occurred.17 Since then, UNMISS has investigated
opening temporary operating bases (TOBs) in areas
where civilians have been under threat, including
New Fangak, Yuai (Uror county), and the Nanaam
river corridor. With the onset of heavy rains likely to
delay construction, however, it remains improbable
that TOBs will be established in the near future.
Their establishment, in any event, would be
contingent on the approval of the UN bureaucracy
and the South Sudanese government, which raises
questions as to why the establishment of these
TOBs was not prioritized earlier.
Even if TOBs are created before the next raiding
campaign against the GPAA, UNMISS has not
demonstrated the will to use force to protect
civilians. Decisions to engage militarily are
ultimately made by the national commanders of the
troop-contributing countries—none of which seem to
be inclined to endanger their peacekeepers or their
own presence in the mission.
The establishment of TOBs can, however, be
interpreted in less black-and-white terms. The UN
17 Telephone interviews with UNMISS staff and international humanitarian workers, January–May 2023.
could reduce hostilities by strategically positioning
UN forces between belligerent parties—as they
managed to do in Upper Nile during the civil war
(Millar, 2022, ch. 9). If TOBs were then explicitly
tasked with becoming Protection of Civilian (PoC)
sites in times of conflict, the mission could usefully
interpose itself between belligerent actors. The
PoC sites established at the beginning of the South
Sudanese civil war saved tens of thousands of lives
and represented the mission’s most progressive and
useful fulfilment of its mandate; however, UNMISS
has since closed all but one PoC site, in Malakal,
Upper Nile state (Craze and Pendle, 2020). One way
to effectively protect civilians in Jonglei would be
to retract this policy of PoC site closures and open
up TOBs that could function as PoC sites across the
state. UNMISS has already done this once in South
Sudan, to great effect, in Tambura in August 2021,
where over 2,400 people fled to the UNMISS ToB for
protection (UNMISS and OHCHR, 2022, p. 7). Such
operations should be considered by the mission.

A Pause Not a Peace: Conflict in Jonglei and the GPAA8Small A r m s Survey SITUATION UPDATE
Craze, Joshua. 2020. The Politics of Numbers: On Security Sector Reform in South Sudan 2005–20. London: London
School of Economics and Political Science.
— and Ferenc Dávid Markó. 2022. ‘Death by Peace: How South Sudan’s Peace Agreement Ate the Grassroots.’ African
Arguments. 6 January.
— and Naomi Pendle. 2020. ‘A Fantasy of Finality: The UN Impasse at the Protection of Civilian Sites in South Sudan.’
African Arguments. 23 September.
IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification). 2022. South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Analysis
July 2022–June 2023. 23 November.
Millar, Mark. 2022. The Peacekeeping Failure in South Sudan: The UN, Bias and the Peacekeeper’s Mind. London:
PAX. 2022. ‘Human Security Survey: South Sudan. Trend Analysis 2016–2022, Jonglei State.’ PAX Protection of
The Sentry. 2021. ‘Sanctioned South Sudanese Businessmen Are Skirting US Sanctions.’ Sentry Alert. October.
Small Arms Survey. 2020. ‘South Sudan’s New State Governors.’ MAAPSS Update No. 2. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 2
—. 2023. ‘Upper Nile Prepares to Return to War.’ Situation Update. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. March.
UNMISS (UN Mission in South Sudan) and OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). 2022. ‘Attacks
on Civilians in Tambura County, June–September 2021.’ 1 March.
UNSC (UN Security Council). 2023. Resolution 2677 (2023). Adopted 15 March. S/RES/2677 (2023) of 15 March.
Young, John. 2007. The White Army: An Introduction and Overview. HSBA Working Paper No. 5. Geneva: Small Arms
Survey. June.

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t +41 22 908 5777, e info@smallarmssurvey.org
www.smallarmssurvey.orgThis Situation Update was
funded by a grant from the
United States Department of
State. The opinions, findings,
and conclusions stated herein
are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect those of
the United States Department
of State.

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Author: Joshua Craze
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